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Funding Consumer Representation:
Models and Fresh Approaches
by James R. Wheaton*

INTRODUCTION
For regulated industries and their
customers, the world is changing with a
speed exceeded only by that of Eastern
Europe. The impacts of recent regulatory changes on the California consumer
can hardly be understated. In the decade
just beginning, several hundred billion
consumer dollars will either remain with
consumers to spend as they wish, or be
drawn off by California's regulated
industries-depending on decisions of
California regulators. This article will
assess whether consumers will be adequately represented when those decisions are made and, if not, what can be
done to assure that they are.
Utility regulation at the California
Public Utilities Commission (PUC) is
changing with dizzying speed. Local
phone companies have been substantially deregulated, with entire portions of
the service tossed into the competitive
sector free of any meaningful regulatory
scrutiny. At the same time, traditional
regulation of the monopoly portion of
the service has been abandoned in favor
of incentives premised on productivity,
with mechanisms for sharing profits
between shareholders and ratepayers.'
The PUC also is deregulating rates in
the transportation sector. Rates for
intrastate freight transport will be deregulated under a recent decision.2 Dump
truck carriage ratesetting, which formerly proceeded on a minimum price cartelset system, has been opened up to wider
competition by allowing freer "deviations" from PUC-established minima for
competitive haulers.' The PUC recently
ordered a new investigation to inquire
whether similar pricing freedom should
be given in the moving industry for used
household goods.4
Decisions about energy prices, sites,
and sources-although less in the news
since both OPEC and the nuclear power
industry have collapsed-will be critical
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to California's future as a leader in population and economic growth, industrial
innovation, and the much-heralded
Pacific Rim trade. These decisions are
within the purview of the PUC (for ratesetting by gas and electrical utilities)
and the California Energy Commission
(CEC) (for energy planning and plant
siting).
Last, as most Californians are aware,
the insurance industry's era of complete
freedom from meaningful regulation,
government scrutiny, and the normal
constraints of the antitrust laws is ending.' Successful on the November 1988
ballot and unanimously upheld by the
California Supreme Court in the face of
a constitutional challenge,' Proposition
103 added, inter alia, sections 1861.01
through 1861.14 to the California
Insurance Code. These provisions subject property-casualty insurers to rate
and policy review, regulation, and ratesetting by the California Department of
Insurance (DOI).
The total number of dollars affected
by these decisions is in the uncounted
billions. These billions are paid directly
by consumers, in the case of utility rates
and their own consumer insurance policies; and also indirectly, in the case of
embedded business costs for the same
items and for transportation. With regard
to utility rates, the California Senate
Office of Research noted not long ago
that "deregulation and competitive market forces have stimulated significant
changes in the utility regulatory environment which threaten to increase substantially residential utility rates. Large
industrial and commercial users of utility services have been gaining significant
concessions from utility regulators at the
expense of residential ratepayers."7
Such momentous changes require
that consumers have effective voices in
the hearing rooms and hallways where
these billion-dollar decisions are made.
The need for consumer representation in
utility rate hearings, for example, is no
longer the subject of informed debate.'
"Residential ratepayers face the greatest
risk in the current deregulated environ-
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ment of paying ever-increasing utility
bills. Yet, their interests are often the
least likely to be fully represented in
rate cases before the CPUC. These
ratepayers will benefit if intervenors
representing their views in CPUC proceedings have sufficient funds to
employ attorneys, expert witnesses and
other competent advocates capable of
addressing the complex and technical
arguments put forth by the utility companies."'
The virtues of consumer representation-even laying aside the acknowledged arguments about its contribution
to a full and balanced record, the decisionmaking process, the eventual decisions, or other lofty concerns about due
and the democratic process-can be put
in stark dollar terms. In San Diego, consumers voluntarily contributed some
$500,000 to an advocacy group to repre-"
sent all ratepayers in utility hearings.
The return on that modest investment
has been "almost $250 million in S[an]
D[iego] G[as] & E[lectric Company]
rate reductions based its advocacy.""
The PUC has long acknowledged all
of these concerns, as has the California
Supreme Court.'2 "[Plublic interest
interveners [sic]...speak for a substantial
segment of the population that otherwise
may go unheard....Public interest interveners ...fill a gap in the ratemaking process....The [Public Utilities] commission
concedes that participation of the general public in ratemaking proceedings 'is
to be commended, and even encouraged.' Effective participation in complex commission hearings, however,
requires technical expertise and continuous scrutiny of various proposals and
rulings. Groups...provide that expertise
and scrutiny as a counterweight to the
views expressed by the utilities."'"
The need for such representation is
no less pressing in the insurance field
and on the transportation side of the
PUC's jurisdiction. In insurance, for
instance, the stakes in Proposition 103
are huge. Personal passenger automobile
insurance, required by California law,"
is a $15 billion market. This is but one
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of hundreds of lines of insurance affected by Proposition 103. Indeed, after
housing, food, and clothing, insurance
has arguably become the next single
largest component of the household
budget. In transportation, consumer participation is vital because the cost of
transportation is hidden in every item in
every store.
This recognized need has found
voice in statute and regulation. The subject of this article is the efficacy of those
statutes and regulations, measured in the
crucible of experience, with tempering
changes proposed. The changes in the
regulatory field outlined above are in
some ways being met by changes in the
mechanisms of consumer participation.
This article will examine the history of
the PUC's consumer intervenor compensation program, describe some significant problems that have developed,
and then compare recent developments
at the CEC and DOI that bear scrutiny
and adoption at the PUC.
MECHANISMS FOR CONSUMER
REPRESENTATION
First, Pay For It Directly. The concept of intervenor compensation is neither new nor difficult. An organization
represents an interest or party that cannot otherwise participate in a legal proceeding. The interest is typically that of
ratepayers, consumers at large, or an
environmental interest. The primary barrier to participation is the inability to
pay the lawyers, experts, other personnel, and other costs required for meaningful participation. The problem is
money. "[V]ery few groups representing
residential ratepayers have enough
funds to participate effectively in major
CPUC rate proceedings. As a consequence, the views of residential ratepayers are often underrepresented at CPUC
hearings."'" The lack of money is usually either because the interest is nonpecuniary-like the environment-or the
pecuniary interest is very small and diffuse on one side but very large and concentrated on the other side-like residential utility ratepayers versus their
utility. In either case, there is no one
with the financial self-interest to fund
effective counter-participation against
the affected industry.
As mentioned above, the effect of
this nonparticipation is both tangible
and intangible. The tangible result is
that consumers lose money measured in

the millions of dollars. Intangibly, the
evidentiary record developed is onesided, the industry's factual assertions
are untested and its arguments unanswered, the decisionmaking process is
warped, and the eventual decisions lack
balance and credibility.
As a solution, both courts and agencies developed the idea of rewarding the
successful advocate for the silent and the
small by forcing the losing industry to
pay for the privilege of augmenting the
decisionmaking process. In legal terms,
the so-called "American Rule" (each
side pays its own lawyers) was modified
so that successful consumer or other litigants would benefit from "fee-shifting"
under which unsuccessful moneyed
interests pay the fees of prevailing litigants.'6 This mechanism is available in
both state' 7 and federal courts.'"
In administrative agencies, the concept is called intervenor funding. Those
who intervene for consumers are awarded compensation for their successful
participation by the affected utility,
which passes the cost on to its benefited
ratepayers." In short, the agency assesses the precise amount of the actual cost
of consumer representation it deems
meritorious and requires the consumers
to pay for it by using the utility as a
pass-through. A more complete history
of the concept of intervenor compensation appears below. But first, a brief
digression is in order.
Alternatives to Paying For It. No discussion of consumer intervenor compensation schemes would be complete without a review of other funding mechanisms. The two principal alternatives to
intervenor compensation-consumer
representation within a government
agency and outside sources of funding
for intervenor groups-employ somewhat indirect mechanisms.
First, the decisionmaking agency or
other arm of state government may create an institutional consumer representative, funded by general state revenues or
from assessments levied on all utilities.
In California utility regulation, this
function is performed by the PUC's
Division of Ratepayer Advocates
(DRA). 2 ' Its staff serves as a valuable
counterweight to the large utilities by
providing consistent advocacy, factual
analysis, and expertise in countering
utility presentations. No consumer
group---however funded or compensated-could ever hope to match the
DRA's resources, stability, and ability to

marshall expertise.
Without in any way denigrating the
role DRA plays, however, any governmental, institutional intervenor is by
nature limited. Both the California
Supreme Court and the PUC have
acknowledged that the DRA cannot be a
complete substitute for the independent
consumer group. Noting that the argument that the PUC "staff adequately represents the public...has a hollow ring,""
the court has observed that "the staff is
subject to institutional pressures that can
create conflicts of interest; and it is circumscribed by significant statutory limitations, such as lack of standing to seek
rehearing or judicial review of commission decisions." 2 The PUC agrees."
Second, repeated efforts to provide a
stable source of continuing funding for
consumer groups outside the hearing
process and the intervenor compensation
system have met with little success to
date. Most of the regulatory and legal
activity has focused on providing some
means of communication between consumer advocacy groups and ratepayers
(hopefully resulting in contributions
from ratepayers) using utility billing
envelopes. The proposal originated with
Ralph Nader and his associates. ' Initial
success in California, both for San
Diego Gas and Electric Company
(SDG&E) and Pacific Gas and Electric
Company (PG&E) ratepayers, was
dashed by the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
California Public Utilities Commission," which held that private utility
corporations have a first amendment
right not to be required to include in
their billing envelopes messages from
private groups with which they disagree.
The decision directly struck down an
order by the PUC requiring PG&E to
carry a fundraising appeal from a private, nondemocratic California residential ratepayer group. Subsequent decisions by the PUC and other courts have
eliminated materials from even statutorily and administratively created, democratic ratepayer groups. 26 This history
and subsequent proposals for enhancing
intervenor group communication and
funding have received
recent, compre27
hensive attention.
Again without denigrating the need
for such mechanisms, for the need is
manifest as recognized by the PUC
itself, 21 the current legal landscape for
such mechanisms is rocky at best and
not a reliable route to ensuring continuing participation by consumer groups. 2'
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History of Intervenor Compensation.
According to the PUC Public Advisor's
Office, the California PUC "has consistently led the nation in developing rules
and programs to involve and compensate intervenors who make a significant
contribution to Commission decisions. "
Interestingly, however, the PUC made
its first foray into intervenor compensation in 1978 when it denied requests for
compensation in a pair of decisions: (1)
Lobby Against
to Consumers
Monopolies (CLAM) for its success in
obtaining an order which disgorged
$400,000 from Pacific Telephone for
disconnection charges, and (2) to
Toward Utility Rate Normalization
(TURN), which successfully challenged
certain ongoing and proposed business
practices and rates of Pacific
Telephone.' In both cases, the PUC held
it had no power to compensate consumers.
When the denials were challenged by
the consumer groups, the California
Supreme Court held that the PUC did in
fact have inherent authority to compensate consumer representation in some
instances. Thus the PUC could make an
award in the CLAM case, under the
equitable law "common fund" theory
when acting as a quasi-adjudicatory
body) 2 Under that doctrine, a party who
creates a monetary fund for the benefit
of others is entitled to a portion of the
fund for the compensatory costs of
securing the fund."
At the same time, the court held that
the PUC lacked the authority to make
such an award in the TURN case, when
exercising its general ratemaking, quasilegislative authority.-' The court rejected
theories based on other equitable doctrines,"5 on recently enacted legislation
permitting court awards for attorneys'
fees,"6 and on the general grant of
authority to do all things "necessary and
convenient" in the PUC's exercise of its
powers and jurisdiction."
Because the principle of intervenor
compensation had been upheld at least
in part, the PUC on its own commenced
an investigation"' to further expand the
proceedings in which compensation
would be available." Rules were adopted in April 1983 to do so.' The PUC
then enlisted the legislature's help, in
order to stave off attacks from utilities
eager to use the latter half of the CLAM
decision. The legislature responded with
Senate Bill 4 in the 1984 session,'
which added sections 1801-08 to the
Public Utilities Code and established a
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firm statutory foundation for PUC intervenor compensation awards in all
ratemaking proceedings involving utilities.42 In reviewing various awards made
under the new rules, the Supreme Court
the authorheld that the statute provided
4
ity found missing in CLAM. 1
Thus ended the legal challenges to
the PUC's authority to make intervenor
awards. A 1986 internal review of the
Commission's program found that "[tihe
Commission's goal of encouraging
intervenor participation has been successful."' However, although the PUC
was the leader in intervenor compensation, severe problems have developed in
the program that threaten to thwart its
goal. Those problems are discussed
below.
In addition, other agencies have
recently begun to develop their own programs for encouraging consumer participation, and are profiting from the
lessons of the PUC program. It appears
that the parade may have marched ahead
of the PUC.
THE PUC SCHEME AND ITS
PROBLEMS
Mindful of Shakespeare's admonition
that "[bIrevity is the soul of wit," this
article will dispense with a lengthy
explanation of the PUC's rules for intervenor compensation, "5 and discuss
instead several problem areas which
threaten to eviscerate the program. 6
Briefly, consumer intervenors 7 must
first make application for a "finding of
eligibility" for compensation. " The
intervenor must show that it represents
"an interest not otherwise adequately
represented," show "significant financial hardship,""0 and submit a description of the positions to be asserted and a
tentative budget for the participation.'
If eligibility is granted, the consumer
group may then make its presentation
and, if successful, apply for an award of
compensation. To receive an award, the
intervenor must make "a substantial
contribution5' -2 in that the PUC's final
order or decision adopts "in whole or in
part one or more factual contentions,
legal contentions, or specific policy or
procedural recommendations presented"
by the intervenor.' The intervention also
must not "materially duplicate the contribution or presentation of any other
party to the proceeding."' Awards may
not exceed the market value of the services rendered. 5
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Problem: What Is A "Contribution"?
As originally adopted, the PUC rules
incorporated a notion of fading relevance in the fast-changing regulatory
world: namely, that all proceedings are
essentially adversarial in nature, with
two (or at least a few) discrete "sides" or
"positions" presented. This notion, borrowed from the judicial model, has created enormous problems in the PUC's
intervenor program and-if not modified-may soon effectively drive all
consumer participants from the PUC.
The PUC rules, as noted, require that
the intervenor make a "substantial contribution" to a final order. Thus, the
intervenor must demonstrate that the
Commission has "adopted in whole or in
part one or more factual contentions,
legal contentions, or specific policy or
procedural recommendations presented......6 In short, the intervenor has to
show that he or she "won".
The notion of "winning" has no place
in intervenor rules, for it displays a
cramped understanding of the role of the
consumer intervenor and the reasons the
Commission should, as a matter of
sound policy, encourage the participation of consumer intervenors. Certainly
it is true that, at least from the utility's
point of view, the role of the intervenor
is limited indeed: to reduce the amount
of money that the utility would otherwise be able to obtain from consumers.
The affected regulatory agency should,
however, reject this limited view.
The purpose of the consumer intervenor, from the agency's point of view,
is not merely to "win", but to serve the
agency itself. The agency's compensation program should not simply reward a
favored group or argument, but should
reward those who help the agency. That
aid and assistance is not necessarily generated by the presentation of the "winning" argument, but by the participation
itself. In short, every nontrivial participant brings something to the table. 7 The
making of public policy in a quasi-legislative setting is not and should not be
viewed as an adversarial struggle
between opposites. Rather, as with the
legislature itself, the process is one of
examination of many points of view, and
the resulting decision is less a
Solomonic splitting of mutually opposing positions than a blending of facts,
arguments, and policies into a stew
where no flavor predominates.
The notion of "winning" or "prevailing" may make sense in the place from
which it came: the lawsuit tried before
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the judiciary. There, a two-sided contest
ends with a clear winner and loser. The
consumer's role is self-evident: to alter
the status quo by requiring that a malefactor disgorge ill-gotten gains, or cease
an objectionable practice. The decision
in a judicial proceeding clearly reveals
whether the status quo has been changed
in the manner advocated by the consumer.
At the PUC or any regulatory agency
exercising ratemaking powers, however,
the consumer intervenor's purpose, from
the agency's point of view, is manifold:
to balance the record; to test the utility's
averments, evidence, and legal theories;
to subject the utility's witnesses to the
crucible of cross-examination; to provide counter-averments, evidence, and
theories-in short, to be a balance to
ensure that the agency is not led into
error by a one-sided record or presentation.
This role transcends mere "winning".
From the regulator's perspective, the
process is enhanced and decisions are
improved by every tempering of the
utility's position, whether before presentation in the knowledge that it will be
subject to effective testing, or during the
hearing in the face of counterfacts and
positions. So, too, the regulatory process
and resultant decisions are improved by
every leveling of the factual playing
field to ensure an unobstructed regulatory view. That the intervenor did not
achieve a "victory" in demonstrable
terms is not the issue. Whether the agency conducted a well-balanced proceeding and made a final decision based on a
complete record is the issue. To limit
compensation only to those cases where
the intervenor can point to clear adoption of a specific argument, without reference to the improvement mere participation brings, is truly to miss the forest
for the trees.
At bottom, the rules should encourage participation by issuing an invitation
to all nontrivial participation. The current rules do the opposite, by implying
that consumer participation is not something to be encouraged, but instead
begrudgingly rewarded, by post hoc and
hence unknowable standards.
These concerns are not new. They
were recognized by the California
Supreme Court a decade ago. "[T]here
may be a number of interveners [sic] in
such [ratemaking] matters, representing
a wide variety of public positions. The
commission's primary task is to assimilate those views into a composite 'pub-
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lic interest,' a give-and-take process
often producing a result that cannot be
deemed a clear-cut victory for any party.
These differences illustrate why certain
concepts developed by the courts for use
in an adversary system are not easily
transplanted outside the adjudicatory
context. Isolating the contribution of
each of numerous interveners is likely to
be impossible, given the complexity of
ratemaking proceedings.'
Four specific examples of the shortcomings of the current prevalent concept will suffice to illustrate the problem
with the notion of "winning".
First, the rules incorporate a "nonduplication" standard." Certainly the PUC
must ensure that it does not reward the
frivolous or purely duplicative "me-too"
participant. However, the compensation
decision is simply the wrong time and
place to address that problem. As with
the trivial participant,' ° the problem of
duplication arises in the hearing room,
in the midst of the process, not afterward at the time of compensation; thus,
the time to deal with it is during the
hearing. The duplicative participant can
and should warned that the presentations, arguments, evidence, and participation are merely cumulative and add
nothing. Where this is true and nothing
is added, no assistance has been rendered to the agency and compensation is
rightly withheld, but the appropriate
time for dealing with duplication is
when it occurs, not afterward. Only then
can timely regulatory admonition prevent the needless waste of time and
resources duplication brings.
As a second, related matter, the
results of the current rule twist the
meaning of "substantial contribution"
into unique contribution. Intervenors are
actively discouraged from cooperating
with other parties. "Most intervenors
want to cooperate with [DRA], but several feel that they have been penalized
for doing do."6' This penalty for cooperation is not limited to DRA, but extends
to cooperation with any other party, for
the adoption of any similar line of argument or coordination of witnesses, evidence, or cross-examination can disqualify an entire presentation as
"duplicative". "[Clooperation between
intervenors and the [DRA] is essential
for the Commission to make the best
possible decisions. The current rules can
be an impediment to this goal."'
Further, the adoption by DRA of an
intervenor's evidence or issue before
presentation can negate the intervenor's

work. The intervenor is actively discouraged from sharing preparation work
with DRA, for if any portion is endorsed
by DRA, the intervenor's contribution is
rendered "duplicative". Similarly, the
intervenor has no incentive to endorse or
support the positions taken by DRA, for
to lend support necessarily leads to
negation of all such work as noncompensable duplication. The net result discourages the convergence of views,
issues, and argument for resolution, and
instead encourages intervenors to stand
aside and preserve their uniqueness.
This practice is not healthy in strictly
adversarial proceedings; it is even less
so in quasi-legislative, multi-party
inquiries.
The third result of the "unique" contribution or "winning" paradigm is to
actively discourage settlement. The
PUC recently adopted rules for settlements." They have proven to be of some
value almost immediately, even in the
most complex matters." However, an
intervenor who enters into a settlement
immediately risks forfeiture of all right
to compensation, because settlements by
definition contain an amalgam of all
parties' positions. The intervenor simply
cannot point to any feature and identify
it as its contribution.
Fourth, it is difficult if not impossible
to identify the intervenor's contribution
"because the order or decision ha[s]
adopted in whole or in part one or more"
arguments of the intervenor, if the intervenor achieves the ultimate success:
abandonment by the utility of a position
altogether. On more than one occasion, a
utility-when faced with specific intervenor opposition-has simply abandoned a line of argument or proposal.
When the intervenor seeks compensation however, the utility-noting the
absence of discussion of its now-withdrawn position in the resulting "order or
decision" of the PUC-argues with
some force that the intervenor has in
fact made no contribution, because the
PUC's order is simply silent as to that
issue. Moreover, the utility typically
argues that the intervenor made no contribution, and that the utility itself made
the decision to preclude the issue from
PUC review by dropping the disputed
matter for reasons unrelated to the intervenor's opposition." This line of argument, although often rejected, makes
sense only if "winning" is the sole measure of contribution. However, the entire
argument is without support under a
more inclusive understanding of contri-
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bution-participation that assists the
PUC in its decision, in this example by
pruning the issues which must be litigated and decided.
Problem: Multipliers and Divisors. It
is well established in court-awarded
attorneys' fees cases that the total award
is determined by calculation of the
"lodestar" or "touchstone" (the total
number of hours expended multiplied by
the market rate for the services), which
total is then frequently enhanced by a
"multiplier" to reward such factors as
efficiency, the magnitude of the result,
the quality of the representation,
and-most importantly-the contingent
nature of the recovery.M
The PUC applies the opposite concept: the touchstone is subjected to a
divisor which ensures that the eventual
award fails to compensate the intervenor
for the fees and costs actually incurred.67
On the average, the PUC has docked
requests by over one-third the amount
sought. Looking only at significant
requests (over $50,000), the figure nears
a 50% reduction.
This reduction is so standard, and has
become so expected, that intervenors at
the PUC use among themselves a 50%
reduction as a general rule. An award
that approaches two-thirds of the request
is cause for remarks; three-quarters elicits a congratulatory phone call from
other knowledgeable and envious
intervenor counsel.
The principal reason for the divisor is
the often arbitrary parsing of costs and
hours performed by the PUC in making
compensation awards. In brief, the PUC
will discount or usually exclude all
hours and costs attributable to any
"issue" that was duplicative of the work
of any other party, or which was not
adopted.
This policy has proven unworkable
in practice, and often devastating to participants. Such an approach requires an
artificial and often impossible division
of work performed and hours spent into
discrete "issue boxes", divisions which
if made are wholly arbitrary and indefensible.
For example, attendance at the testimony and cross-examination of a hostile, central witness will typically
involve twelve hours-six for preparation, six for attendance. During the
attendance at direct and cross, many
issues will be discussed, argued,
reviewed, and examined. The cross
itself will include many, many areas of

TABLE 1
PUC INTERVENOR COMPENSATION AWARDS
1981-1989
Summary Data
Average Request:
Median Request:
$47,156
Average Award:
$29,730
Median Award:
Total Awarded:
$2,437,846

$23,134
$16,897

Averaging Data
Weighted average award, as a percentage of request:
63%
Average percent of request awarded, where request under $50,000:
72%
Average percent of request awarded, where request exceeds $50,000: 56%
Time Data
Average time between request for award and decision (days):
Median time between request for award and decision (days):

examination, most of which are dead
ends, some of which reveal nuggets to
be used later. The total number of
"issues" touched upon will span the
gamut. However, the advocate cannot
leave the room for those which are unrelated, or those which are likely to be
abandoned or unsuccessful. All of the
preparation and attendance is required,
even if only a tiny fraction later turns
out to be vital to the decision.
The scenario posited here is not
unique or odd: it is the norm. Every
advocate knows that a considerable
amount of the time spent on a case is not
part of an uninterrupted march toward
the eventual goal. Much time is spent
chasing alternatives, researching and
pursuing lines of cross that are cul-desacs, preparing for eventualities that
never emerge, and arguing points
thought to be dubious because the client
needs the argument made, because the
large reward makes the slim chance of
success worth it, or because the loss of
one argument paves the way for a related argument.
In brief, consumer representation is
infrangible. The interests and issues cannot be divided along arbitrary lines.
However plain the "success" and "failure" may be in hindsight, all of the
advocate's costs and time in preparation
for and participation in a utility ratesetting proceeding are necessary. Failure to
prepare or attend is arguably a breach of
the attorney's duty to zealously represent the client's interests.
Imagine for a moment that the PUC
decided to completely disallow utility
expenses in rate cases for the utility's
attorneys, experts, and costs whenever
an argument, evidence, presentation was
less than 100% successful. It would be
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absurd to suggest that utility staff attorneys should receive a diminished paycheck contingent upon the success of
their evidence and arguments.
Penalizing already underfunded and
underpaid intervenors on the same basis
makes no greater sense.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized
the futility in attempting to secondguess an advocate's preparation and
strategy last term when it held that success on any of a party's averments entitles the party to compensation for all
work performed, even where the party
does not prevail on every or even most
positions.7" The PUC should adopt the
same position. Combined with the rules
on "substantial contribution" which
effectively require a "unique" contribution and disregard that which is
"duplicative" or cooperative, the divisor
rule unfairly penalizes those the PUC
should most want to encourage.
Problem: Delays. There is no more
pressing problem for intervenors at the
PUC than the delays in compensation.
The first and most crushing is suffered
because the program prohibits any compensation until all of the work has been
completed and the final order has been
issued. This problem is compounded
because intervenors must invest their
limited resources for years with no
assurance whatsoever that they will be
compensated at all, even on a delayed
basis. This type of delay is inherent in a
system where "winning" is the sole
measure of "contribution", because the
"winner" cannot be determined until the
entire matter grinds to a conclusion.
Even disregarding the natural delays
attendant to the hearings and decisions
on the substance of the matter, the
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delays in compensation decisions alone
can be crippling. Arrayed in Table I are
statistics for PUC compensation decisions for the last ten years, showing
only the time between the application
following the substantive decision and
the actual award. The delay in payment
averages eight months, far longer than
any creditor would wait for payment for
services, particularly services rendered
years before. In the most egregious case,
nearly three years elapsed from application to decision, for work performed
fully seven years before. The message to
private counsel and interested consumer
representatives: work at the PUC is
effectively for free, even if you win, for
compensation is months or years away.
The statistics in Table I include
every compensation decision reported at
72
the PUC through 1989,71 105 in all.
The data reveal several interesting patterns. First, the relative size of the
awards is surprisingly small. Only ten
awards have exceeded even $50,000;
only three exceeded $100,000." The
majority have been less than $20,000.
Second, the PUC apparently spends
tremendous amounts of time deliberating over small amounts of money.
Delays exceeding six months are routine; delays of over one year are common. However, the actual savings
accomplished by this careful, deliberate
scrutiny is de minimis. This is true
regardless of whether the entire request
is approved, or the PUC exercises its
discretion to reduce the award. In one
case the PUC took two years only to
decide to award the entire request,
which amounted to just $39,570." 4
Conversely, the PUC took over a
year-401 days-to reduce a request by
a total of $375.11 These delays rival the
time it takes to issue a rate decision
involving an entire utility in which billions of dollars are at stake.
Last, and considering the relatively
modest sums requested and the extraordinary length of time from request to
decision (not to mention the time from
commencement of the case until the
final decision starts the clock for filing
the compensation request), the diminution of the requests into final awards by
use of the "substantial contribution" and
"duplication" standards borders on the
punitive.
Problem: Below Market Rates.
Finally, the PUC has been tergiversatory
in determining hourly rates for intervenors. The purpose of intervenor com-
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pensation is to attract and sustain competent representation for consumers. In a
market economy, where an attorney's or
expert's time can be spent in many areas
and endeavors, the only feasible way of
achieving that goal is to pay market
rates. The PUC does so without a second thought in one aspect of the cases
before it-when it approves costs for
utilities. A utility that incurs expenses
for legal representation or expert studies
in defending its interests is permitted to
recoup the full amount of its costs, 76 and
at the full market rate charged if outside
legal counsel is used. Those hourly rates
now routinely exceed $300 per hour.
First-year associates who can barely
find the copier, much less the hearing
room, are billed at $125 per hour.
On the other hand, experienced consumer intervenor counsel are awarded
fees which are a fraction of the market
rate. The PUC rules require that the
PUC "take into consideration the compensation paid to persons of comparable
training and experience who offer similar services...[but] may not, in any case,
exceed the market value of services paid
by the Commission or the public utility,
whichever is greater..... ' " The reference
to "market value" is but a dream for
consumer intervenors.
Although neither the PUC nor the
public utilities could possibly find a law
firm willing to represent them at less
than market rates, consumers are
required to do so. For instance, the highest rate ever awarded for any consumer
advocate is $175 per hour. The individual-one of the most experienced public
interest attorneys in PUC proceedings-appeared both as an attorney and
as an expert witness in the particular
matter."8 No attorney fee rate for con-79
sumer counsel has ever exceeded $150.
The standard rate at present is $125 per
hour. As recently as 1986, the PUC was
awarding consumer intervenor fees at
less than $100 per hour."
Thus the PUC effectively penalizes
any attorney who chooses to represent
consumers by automatically deducting
up to one-half of the otherwise available
compensation. The result is expected:
private counsel from law firms representing the interests of consumers are
essentially unheard of at the PUC. The
only representatives of consumers come
from existing public interest organizations which are largely funded from
other sources. The PUC has sent a clear
message to the legal community: your
work for consumers is not worth it.

This agency policy of systematically
underfunding only consumer intervenors
is in marked contrast to the practice in
the state and federal courts.' There the
market rate is not the cap; it is the presumptive standard for all attorneys. This
is true whether the attorney works for a
private firm or is a modestly salaried
employee of a public interest organization. In either case, the rate should be
the same, and efficiency and economy
should not be penalized. The result of
the PUC policy has been, however, a
severe disincentive to attracting private
attorneys into the PUC to represent consumers. So long as the PUC refuses to
permit them to recover their costs, they
will stay away. At the present time, no
more than four groups regularly represent consumers at the PUC. 2 At least
one is giving serious consideration to
curtailing or terminating that representation because of the problems with the
intervenor compensation program. 3

ALTERNATIVE MODELS
The problems that have become so
manifest at the PUC have not gone
unnoticed at other regulatory agencies.
Compensation systems for consumer
intervenors have recently been created at
the California Energy Commission and
the Department of Insurance." Both programs avoid the PUC problems, and
enjoy an enhanced chance of long-term
success in attracting and sustaining
competent consumer representation.
Energy Commission. The CEC's pilot
intervenor funding program is funded by
an appropriation of $285,000 from
California's share of the federal
Petroleum Violation Escrow Account
funds. 5 Compensation is available for
quasi-legislative proceedings which
yield reports prepared by the CEC on
electricity, conservation, energy, fuels,
energy development and appliance efficiency standards. 6
The principal differences between the
CEC and PUC programs are:
(1) The CEC program does not
require repeated "requests for finding of
eligibility" as does the PUC. 7 Instead,
the CEC permits a financial hardship
finding, once determined, to remain
valid for two years without reapplication." The eligibility standard is easy to
apply. Among other alternatives, any
organization defined in the Internal
Revenue Code as a charitable organiza-
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tion under section 501(c)(3) of the Code
enjoys a "rebuttable presumption" of
eligibility. 9
(2) Upon intervention in a proceeding, the consumer participant need only
file a petition for determination of relevancy, designed to weed out, at the outset, the frivolous and the duplicative. If
granted, the CEC also sets a proposed
cap on total compensation." This process serves the dual purpose of establishing eligibility for each proceeding
without any unnecessary, repetitive filings, and also ensuring against undesirable participation. It is superior to the
PUC's practice of addressing duplicative participation by penalizing the participant after the proceeding is completed, in a post hoc and therefore capricious manner.
(3) At the completion of the hearing,
the intervenor may apply for compensation.' This is an important difference
from the PUC model, where the application may not be filed until issuance of
the final decision. The inherent delay
between the actual performance of work
and the issuance of the compensation
decision is vastly reduced by the CEC's
procedure. This is particularly helpful
where the intervenor participates in only
one portion of a proceeding that will
continue for months or years before any
final decision is issued.
(4) Perhaps most important, the CEC
has explicitly
rejected the PUC's test of
"winning".92 The CEC has adopted the
model in which all nontrivial participation is to be rewarded. The tests for
compensation at the CEC are easy and
sensible: (a) whether the applicant made
the presentation originally approved as
relevant; (b) whether the presentation
was competent; (c) whether the expenses claimed are appropriate; and (d)
whether the claimed costs are within the
limit initially set. 3 Notably absent is any
suggestion that the intervenor's position
be the one that prevails, or even that the
compensation must await the final decision.
(5) As a permissible corollary to welcoming participation without reference
to "winning", the CEC also included a
limited mechanism for providing intervenor funding throughout the proceeding. An applicant who has previously
shown its eligibility and competence,
because it has been awarded compensation in the past, and who demonstrates
specific need in the particular proceeding, may receive partial advance funding." The concept of advance funding
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has been much debated in intervenor circles, but no other state agency has yet
adopted it. The CEC program provides a
useful model for others.
The CEC model combines two
important concepts. First, participation
itself is the goal and should be rewarded. Second, barriers to compensation
should be lowered when a participant
has assisted in the past and will do so in
the future. This contrasts sharply with
the PUC model, where participation is
continually suspect and requires repetitive application and testing, and compensation (if any) always follows
months and years of delay, and then is
guaranteed to be only a fraction of the
market value. The CEC program
promises to be an experiment worth
examining and replicating elsewhere.95
Department of Insurance. At the
DOI, two intervenor compensation programs are currently in existence, and a
third permanent program is still aboming. All three stem from the language of
Proposition 103, which requires "reasonable advocacy and witness fees to
any person who demonstrates that (1)
the person represents the interests of
consumers, and (2) that he or she has
made a substantial contribution to the
adoption of any order, regulation or
decision....".
One program, adopted by emergency
regulations on September 27, 1989,
establishes a system largely similar to
that in place at the PUC.97 However,
there is no existing proceeding in which
those rules are being applied.
The second program is pursuant to an
order issued in two related proceedings
to implement Proposition 103.90 There,
the administrative law judges issued an
order permitting payments to intervenors on an interim basis every thirty
days upon billing." Like the CEC, this
system permits continuing funding, and
does not require a final decision. In principle, at least, this approach adopts the
core concept of the CEC program,
rejecting the PUC paradigm. However,
that system at press time has begun only
with the initial filings by some consumer participants, and no final decisions have yet been rendered.
DOI's permanent intervenor compensation system is still being developed by
the Commissioner as this article is being
published." ° In hearings before the DOI
in late November 1989, consumer representatives united to urge adoption of a
broad program that provides full com-
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pensation and which corrects the PUC
program's defects. The insurance industry urged the DOI to adopt the identical
system in place at the PUC, with all the
faults, delays, and limitations on eligibility and payment.
While the confines of the final program are not settled, it appears that the
DOI is leaning away from the pitfalls of
the PUC program, in favor of one more
in line with that of the CEC. As principal evidence, the Commissioner included in the DOI Regulations a ringing
statement of "purpose and intent" for the
rules. Included among these is "ensuring
and encouraging widespread and effective participation by California consumers.""0 ' The Commissioner's decisions will "include[] weighing and consideration of the financial resources and
economic interests of the competing
parties [and] compensation shall be
awarded in a manner and at a level
which such participation could ' com2
mand in the private marketplace.'
As an example of these purposes, the
DOI Regulations reject the PUC
paradigm of "winning". In keeping with
the enabling statute, the only tests for
compensation are that the intervenor
"makes a substantial contribution" to the
proceeding, and "represents the interests
of consumers."'01 As a second example,
the rules state that "[t]he compensation
awarded shall equal the market value of
the services provided.""'
The DOI has also proposed elimination of repetitive eligibility applications.
Instead of refiling in every matter, a
consumer intervenor, once found eligible, may carry that eligibility forward
for all proceedings within the following
two calendar years. ' 01
By far the most innovative concept
included in the DOI proposed rules is
the timing and mechanism for deciding
compensation. Under the DOI
Regulations, decisions determining and
awarding compensation will be issued
as part of the decision on the merits.'"
This is a monumental change from current practice elsewhere that solves in a
stroke many of the problems highlighted
above in the PUC program.
By combining the decision on the
underlying matter and the compensation
decision, the procedure makes explicit
that the contribution is part and parcel of
the hearing itself, not a post hoc, independent concern that must be separately
litigated. It is the participation, assistance, and contribution to the process
that is the object of intervenor compen-

SV

sation. This can be recognized and
addressed by the decisionmaker when
the merits are decided.
This procedure also avoids the needless waste of time, resources, and agency attention on what is, at best, a peripheral matter. By combining the two decisions, duplicative briefing, argument,
and opinions are avoided. There is no
need to attempt to recast the intervenor's
contribution or participation, or the
agency intent, to make them fit the final
decision. Moreover, the delay that has
crippled the PUC process is eliminated
in its entirety.
Overall, combining the decision on
the merits and the compensation awarded to intervenors is an outstanding innovation in intervenor compensation that
deserves to be replicated in all other
agencies.
If the principles contained in the DOI
proposed rules are finally adopted, it is
likely that the DOI will have a far more
successful program of intervenor compensation than has been the case at the
PUC. Such a program promises to be an
outstanding model for other agencies,
both in California and elsewhere.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS
FOR THE PUC
In light of the longstanding problems
in the PUC's intervenor compensation
program and the new concepts being
tested at the CEC and DOI, the time has
come for amendment of the PUC program. Although certain aspects of the
program may be altered through PUC
administrative action,' 7 substantial
changes will need to be achieved
through legislation. For that reason, not
all of the blame can be laid at the feet of
the PUC. The need for repetitive eligibility applications is one such example.
On the other hand, the lengthy delays in
the issuance of intervenor compensation
decisions are attributable solely to the
PUC. Other matters, such as the divisor
rules, the failure to adopt market rates,
and the prevalence of the "win" requirement in order to be compensated, are
problems that began with the enabling
statute but were solidified by PUC decision and implementation. In any case,
the calcification by repeated use makes
these standards effectively unchangeable without legislative intervention.
There can be little doubt but that the
need for consumer participation is
greater now than when intervenor com-
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pensation was first begun at the PUC.
Not only the PUC, but also the CEC and
DOI will in the next decade be allocating billions of consumer dollars, and
making decisions about services and
products that are vital to California's
consumers, business, and economy.
Without fresh approaches to consumer
participation and compensation, consumer voices will be silent when those
decisions are made.
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